We consider the properties of equilibrium behaviour in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism. Various positive properties such as the cyclicity of equilibrium programs, and the convergence of equilibrium stocks to a steady state, are analyzed. Among other normative properties, it is established that under certain natural conditions, Nash equilibrium programs are efficient and "modified Pareto optimal", in a sense made clear in the paper, but never Pareto optimal in the traditional sense.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the properties of equilibria in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism.' In this model, each generation is active for a single period. At the beginning of this period, it receives an endowment of a single homogeneous good which is the output from a "bequest investment" made by the previous generation. It divides the endowment between consumption and investment. The return from this investment constitutes the endowment of the next generation. Each generation derives utility from its own consumption and that of its immediate successor. However, since altruism is limited, in the sense that no generation cares about later successors, the interests of distinct agents come into conflict. Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974a) elucidates the implications of Rawls' principle of just savings. Others, beginning with Phelps and Pollak (1968) , have addressed the question of how an "altruistic growth economy" might actually evolve over time. Topics of subsequent investigation have included the efficiency and optimality of equilibrium programs, and the implications of intergenerational altruism for the distribution of wealth.
Models of this type have been used to analyze a number of issues concerning intergenerational altruism. One line of research, pursued by
Unfortunately, the positive features of equilibrium programs have received little attention from previous authors. Aside from a few comments by Kohlberg (1976) , virtually nothing is known about the asymptotic behaviour of capital stocks in these models. In particular, will the long-run capital stock which arises from intergenerational conflict be higher or lower than the "turnpike" associated with the solution to the optimal planning problem? On a priori grounds, the answer is not clear. Agents who take only a limited interest in the future will tend to bequeath less than those who are far-sighted. However, since each generation views its children's bequest as pure waste, it must bequeath a larger sum to obtain the same consumption value.
In this paper, we obtain steady-state results for equilibrium capital stocks completely analogous to the well-known optimal planning results. By comparing "steady-states", we show that no limit point of equilibrium capital stocks can exceed the planning turnpike. Under slightly more restrictive conditions, we show that the equilibrium capital stock never exceeds the planning stock in any period.
We also address a number of normative issues which have been raised by other authors. In particular, Dasgupta (1974b) has shown that, for a specific parameterization of the general model, equilibrium programs are never Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, Lane and Mitra (1981) have established (under appropriate conditions) the existence of equilibrium programs which are Pareto optimal in a modified sense. Unfortunately, their study employs a restrictive notion of equilibrium, which typically implies a certain amount of myopic behaviour. In general, the equilibria which they consider correspond to subgame perfect equilibria only under very specific parametrizations of the model. In this paper, we establish that, under very general conditions, the set of Markov perfect equilibrium2 programs for this class of altruistic growth economies are always efficient and modified Pareto optimal, but never Pareto optimal in the traditional sense. These results do not depend upon parametric forms.
The current paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the model, basic assumptions and definitions of equilibria, and reviews some important results which appear in Bernheim and Ray (1983) and Leininger (1983) . Positive aspects of equilibrium programs are considered in Section 3; normative aspects are discussed in Section 4. All proofs are deferred to Section 5.
THE MODEL
The model is closely related to those of Arrow (1973), Dasgupta (1974a, b) , Kohlberg (1976) , Lane and Mitra (1981) , and Leininger (1983) , and is a special case of the stationary altruistic growth economy described in Bernheim and Ray (1983) . There is one commodity, which may be consumed or invested. The transformation of capital stock into output takes one period, and is represented by a production function f In the following sections, certain results require only one weak assumption about f: Assumption 1. f: R+ -> R+ is increasing, continuous and f(O) = 0.
To establish other results, we strengthen this assumption by adding combinations of the following additional restrictions: Assumption 2. f is continuously differentiable, and limk,of'(k)> 1.
Assumption 3.1. f is concave.
Assumption 3.2. f is strictly concave.
In each time period, decisions concerning production and consumption are made by a fresh generation. Thus, generation t is endowed with some initial output (y,), which it divides between consumption (c,) and investment (k, = y, -c,). Each generation derives utility from its own consumption, and the consumption of the generation immediately succeeding it. Preferences are represented by a common utility function, w. We assume that w satisfies certain relatively weak conditions:3 For certain results (particularly those concerning comparisons between equilibrium and planning programs) it will be convenient to assume that agents discount the future at some positive rate. In these cases, we will impose one of the following restrictions on 8. We will impose the behavioural assumption that all generations select subgame perfect Nash strategies (see Selten (1975) Under Assumptions 1 and 4, existence of a stationary equilibrium is guaranteed within the class of monotonic (non-decreasing) lower semicontinuous savings functions; furthermore, equilibrium policy functions are always monotonic, regardless of whether they are associated with stationary or nonstationary equilibria (see Bernheim and Ray (1983) and Leininger (1983) ). Since we use this monotonicity property extensively throughout the current paper, we restate the relevant theorem here, without proof. Surprisingly, it is difficult to guarantee that equilibrium policy functions are strictly monotonic at all y. Specifically, Leininger (1983) has established that if any equilibrium savings schedule is discontinuous, then all previous savings schedules have intervals over which they are not strictly monotonic. This observation is important, since no one has yet been able to establish existence within the class of continuous savings schedules. Fortunately, strict monotonicity plays a small role in the following sections.
POSITIVE BEHAVIOUR
In intertemporal optimal planning models, an important characteristic of optimum capital stocks and consumption levels is that these converge, over time, to some stationary input-output-consumption configuration. In this section, we establish some analogous results for the limiting behaviour of capital stocks under a bequest equilibrium.
In stationary models, stationary equilibria always exist (Bernheim and Ray (1983), Leininger (1983) ). Of course, this does not preclude the existence of non-stationary equilibria in such models. Of particular interest for asymptotic stock behaviour are periodic non-stationary equilibria. Remark. The steady state theorem has been obtained without assuming separability or concavity of the utility functions, or convexity of the technology. In these respects, compare the results to that obtained by Mitra and Ray (1984) for planning models.
We now turn to a comparison of limiting capital stocks for bequest equilibrium with turnpike levels obtained in aggregative planning models. An omniscient planner who takes into account the infinite stream of utilities of all generations is clearly acting more farsighted than a single generation which only cares about the consumption of its successor. On that score, one would expect a larger stock to be generated in the long-run, under planning. However, while each generation cares only about its successor, it recognizes that its successor will do the same, and, in anticipating bequests to be made by the successor, may compensate by bequeathing a larger amount. This tends to increase the limiting stock under a bequest equilibrium. The question of which steady state is larger, is, therefore, non-trivial.
To facilitate comparison, assume that Assumption 5 holds. In the corresponding planned economy version of the model, a "planner" seeks a feasible consumption program (c^,) such that for all feasible consumption programs (ct)0 ,
or, if all feasible utility sums converge, the planner maximizes, subject to feasibility constraints, zt=0 8tv(c,).
(3.2)
Call such a maximizing program an optimal program. That this maximization process adequately represents the corresponding planned economy may be rationalized in two ways. First, we may simply envisage a formal comparison between two economies, identical in technology and one-period utilities; the one governed by two-period bequest motives, the other by an omniscient planner whose social welfare function is expressible as (3.2), or the form implicit in (3.1). Secondly, we can imagine all consumption choices in the altruistic growth economy being left to the planner who has the same discount factor 8 as each generation. In this case, the planner replaces the maximization of (3.2) by7 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3.2, 5, 5.2, and 6, if (yt, ct, kt) o is a feasible program from yo generated by some bequest equilibrium (s*)?, then it is efficient.
Since the utility of each generation depends on its own consumption as well as that of its successor, efficiency in consumption does not guarantee Pareto optimality. In fact, as long as the marginal propensity to consume of generation 1 is less than unity, a transfer of consumption from generation 0 to generation 1 always yields a Pareto dominating allocation. In this way, we establish As mentioned earlier, s* may not be strictly monotonic over certain intervals; therefore, we cannot generally guarantee that the equilibrium program is Pareto suboptimal for all initial conditions. However, it is important to note that, while strict monotonicity at y1 is a sufficient condition for suboptimality, it is not a necessary condition. Indeed, with substantial work, one can obtain a stronger result: if s* is strictly monotonic at yt for any odd t, then, under the other conditions stated above, the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. We believe (but have not proven) that this weaker condition is necessary as well as sufficient for domination to be possible.
Of course, a scheme for dominating the equilibrium program by lowering c0 leaves generation -1 strictly worse off. If we rule out alternatives which are damaging to this pre-historic generation, it becomes impossible to dominate efficient equilibrium programs. The efficiency of these programs alone is sufficient to guarantee modified Pareto optimality. This is stated in 
